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always committed at the behest and with the complicity of those in power. Historically, its perpetrators were above the law, at least within their own countries, except in rare cases involving a change in regime. In human history, the concept of international legal norms from which no State may derogate has emerged only relatively recently. This is, of course, the story of the international protection of human rights. The prohibition of persecution of ethnic groups runs like a golden thread through the de®ning moments of the history of human rights. International law's role in the protection of national, racial, ethnic and religious groups from persecution can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which provided certain guarantees for religious minorities. 5 Other early treaties contemplated the protection of Christian minorities within the Ottoman empire 6 and of francophone Roman Catholics within British North America. 7 These concerns with the rights of national, ethnic and religious groups evolved into a doctrine of humanitarian intervention which was invoked to justify military activity on some occasions during the nineteenth century. 8 International human rights law can also trace its origins to the law of armed con¯ict, or international humanitarian law. Codi®cation of the law of armed con¯ict began in the nineteenth century. In its early years, this was oriented to the protection of medical personnel and the prohibition of certain types of weapons. The Hague Regulations of 1907 re¯ect the focus on combatants but include a section concerning the treatment of civilian populations in occupied territories. In particular, article 46 requires an occupying belligerent to respect`[f ]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice'. 9 Moreover, the preamble to the Hague Regulations contains the promising`Martens clause', which states that`the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience'. 10 But aside from sparse references to cultural and religious institutions, 11 nothing in the Regulations suggests any particular focus on vulnerable national or ethnic minorities. 12 Early developments in the prosecution of`genocide'
The new world order that emerged in the aftermath of the First World War, and that to some extent was re¯ected in the 1919 peace treaties, manifested a growing role for the international protection of human rights. Two aspects of the post-war regime are of particular relevance to the study of genocide. First, the need for special protection of national minorities was recognized. This took the form of a web of treaties, bilateral and multilateral, as well as unilateral declarations. The world also saw the ®rst attempt to establish an international criminal court, accompanied by the suggestion that massacres of ethnic minorities within a State's own borders might give rise to both State and individual responsibility.
The wartime atrocities committed against the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire 13 had been met with a joint declaration from the governments of France, Great Britain and Russia, dated 24 May 1915, asserting that`[i]n the presence of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the allied Governments publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well as those of its agents who are found to be involved in such massacres '. 14 It has been suggested that this constitutes the ®rst use, at least within an inter- of the Turkish government to deport the Armenians to the extent that they lived`within the zone of military operations'. But, he said,`[i]t was not to my mind the deportation which was objectionable but the horrible brutality which attended its execution. It is one of the blackest pages in the history of this war, and I think we were fully justi®ed in intervening as we did on behalf of the wretched people, even though they were Turkish subjects.' 16 
Versailles and the Leipzig trials
The idea of an international war crimes trial had been proposed by Lord Curzon at a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on 20 November 1918. 17 The British emphasized trying the Kaiser and other leading Germans, and there was little or no interest in accountability for the persecution of innocent minorities such as the Armenians in Turkey. 18 The objective was to punish`those who were responsible for the War or for atrocious offences against the laws of war'. 19 As Lloyd George explained,`[t]here was also a growing feeling that war itself was a crime against humanity '. 20 At the second plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference, on 25 January 1919, a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties was created. 21 Composed of ®fteen representatives of the victorious powers, the Commission was mandated to inquire into and to report upon the violations of international law committed by Germany and its allies during the course of the war.
The Commission's report used the expression`Violations of the Laws and Customs of War and of the Laws of Humanity'. 22 Some of these breaches came close to the criminal behaviour now de®ned as genocide or crimes against humanity and involved the persecution of ethnic minorities or groups. Under the rubric of`attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory', the Commission cited many offences in Serbia committed by Bulgarian, German and Austrian authorities, including prohibition of the Serb language,`[p]eople beaten for saying`g ood morning'' in Serbian', destruction of archives of churches and law courts, and the closing of schools. 23 As for`wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational and historic buildings and monuments', there were examples from Serbia and Macedonia of attacks on schools, monasteries, churches and ancient inscriptions by the Bulgarian authorities.
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The legal basis for qualifying these acts as war crimes was not explained, although the Report might have referred to Chapter III of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which codi®ed rules applicable to the occupied territory of an enemy. 25 But nothing in the Hague Regulations suggested their application to anything but the territory of an occupied belligerent. Indeed, there was no indication in the Commission's report that the Armenian genocide fell within the scope of its mandate. 26 The Commission proposed the establishment of an international`High Tribunal', and urged`that all enemy persons alleged to have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity' be excluded from any amnesty and be brought before either national tribunals or the High Tribunal. 29 and that leaders be deemed liable for the acts of their subordinates. 30 But while clearly lukewarm to the idea, the American delegation did not totally oppose the convening of war crimes trials. However, it said efforts should be con®ned to matters undoubtedly within the scope of the term laws and customs of war', which provided`a standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the practice of nations'. 31 The Japanese members also submitted dissenting comments, but these were considerably more succinct, and did not focus on the issue of crimes against humanity.
At the Peace Conference itself, Nicolas Politis, Greek Foreign Minister and a member of the Commission of Fifteen, proposed creating a new category of war crimes, designated`crimes against the laws of humanity', intended to cover the massacres of the Armenians.
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Woodrow Wilson protested a measure he considered to be ex post facto law. 33 Wilson eventually withdrew his opposition, but he felt that in any case such efforts would be ineffectual. 34 At the meeting of the Council of Four on 2 April 1919, Lloyd George said it was important to judge those responsible`for acts against individuals, atrocities of all sorts committed under orders'. 35 Although article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated that Kaiser Wilhelm II was to be tried, this never took place because of the refusal of the Netherlands to extradite him. Articles 228 to 230 allowed for the creation of international war crimes tribunals, the ®rst in history.
36 They were to try persons accused of violating the laws and customs of war, yet in deference to the American objections the Treaty of Versailles did not 29 Citing Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon et al., 7 Cranch 116, in support. 30`I t is one thing to punish a person who committed, or, possessing the authority, ordered others to commit an act constituting a crime; it is quite another thing to punish a person who failed to prevent, to put and end to, or to repress violations of the laws or customs of war', said the refer to`crimes against the laws of humanity'. The new German government voted to accept the treaty, but conditionally, and it refused the war criminals clauses, noting that its penal code prevented the surrender of Germans to a foreign government for prosecution and punishment. 37 A compromise was effected, deemed compatible with article 228 of the Versailles Treaty, whereby the Supreme Court of the Empire in Leipzig would judge those charged by the Allies. Germany opposed arraignment of most of those chosen for prosecution by the Allies, arguing that the trial of its military and naval elite could imperil the government's existence. 38 In the end, only a handful of German soldiers were tried, for atrocities in prisoner of war camps and sinking of hospital ships. 39 A Commission of Allied jurists set up to examine the results at Leipzig concluded`that in the case of those condemned the sentences were not adequate'.
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The Treaty of Se Ávres and the Armenian genocide With regard to Turkey, the Allies considered prosecution for mistreatment of prisoners, who were mostly British, but also for`deportations and massacres', in other words, the persecution of the Armenian minority. 41 The British High Commissioner, Admiral Calthorpe, informed the Turkish Foreign Minister on 18 January 1919 that`His Majesty's Government are resolved to have proper punishment in¯icted on those responsible for Armenian massacres'. 42 Calthorpe's subsequent dispatch to London said he had informed the Turkish government that British statesmen`had promised [the] civilized world that persons connected would be held personally responsible and that it was [the] ®rm intention of HM Government to ful®l [that] promise'. 43 Subsequently, the High Commission proposed the Turks be punished for the Armenian massacres by dismemberment of their Empire and the criminal trial of high of®cials to serve as an example. 44 London believed that prosecution could be based on`the common 37 law of war', or`the customs of war and rules of international law'. 45 Trials would be predicated on the concept that an occupying military regime is entitled to prosecute offenders on the territory where the crime has taken place because it is, in effect, exercising de facto authority in place of the former national regime. Jurisdiction would not, therefore, be based on broader notions rooted in the concept of universality.
Under pressure from Allied military rulers, the Turkish authorities arrested and detained scores of their leaders, later releasing many as a result of public demonstrations and other pressure. 46 In late May 1919, the British seized sixty-seven of the Turkish prisoners and spirited them away to more secure detention in Malta and elsewhere. 47 But the British found that political considerations, including the growth of Kemalism and competition for in¯uence with other European powers, made insistence on prosecutions increasingly untenable. 48 In mid-1920, a political-legal of®cer at the British High Commission in Istanbul cautioned London of practical dif®culties involved in prosecuting Turks for the Armenian massacres, including obtaining evidence. 49 By late 1921, the British had negotiated a prisoner exchange agreement with the Turks, and the genocide suspects held in Malta were released. 50 Attempts by Turkish jurists to press for trial before the national courts of those responsible for the atrocities were slightly more successful. 51 Prosecuted on the basis of the domestic penal code, several ministers in the wartime cabinet and leaders of the Ittihad party were found guilty by a court martial, on 5 July 1919, of`the organization and execution of crime of massacre' against the Armenian minority. 52 The criminals were sentenced, in absentia, to capital punishment or lengthy terms of imprisonment. 53 According to the Treaty of Se Ávres, signed on 10 August 1920, Turkey recognized the right of trial`notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Turkey' (art. 226), and was obliged to surrender`all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are speci®ed either by name or by rank, of®ce or employment which they held under Turkish authori-45 FO 371/4174/129560 (folios 430±1), cited in ibid., p. 283. 46 The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on the 1st August, 1914. The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the Tribunal which shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such Tribunal. In the event of the League of Nations having created in suf®cient time a Tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before the Tribunal, and the Turkish Government undertakes equally to recognise such Tribunal. 
Inter-war developments
The post-First World War efforts at international prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity were a failure. Nevertheless, the idea had been launched. Over the next two decades criminal law specialists turned their attention to a series of proposals for the repression of international crimes. The ®rst emerged from the work of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, appointed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1920 and assigned to draw up plans for the international judicial institutions. One of the members, Baron Descamps of Belgium, proposed the establishment of a`high court of international justice'. 54 62 Hitler was, tragically, one step ahead. Only after his genocidal policies were ineluctably underway did the law begin to assume its pivotal role in the repression of the crime of genocide.
Also in the aftermath of the First World War, the international community constructed a system of protection for national minorities that, inter alia, guaranteed to these groups the`right to life'. 63 It is almost as if international lawmakers sensed the coming Holocaust. Their focus was on vulnerable groups identi®ed by nationality, ethnicity and religion, the very groups that would bear the brunt of Nazi persecution and ultimately mandate development of the law of genocide. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the minorities treaties were intended to`secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race, language 59 or religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs'. 64 According to Hersh Lauterpacht,`the system of Minorities Treaties failed to afford protection in many cases of agrant violation and although it acquired a reputation for impotence, with the result that after a time the minorities often refrained from resorting to petitions in cases where a stronger faith in the effectiveness of the system would have prompted them to seek a remedy ' . 65 Yet to a certain and limited extent their provisions stalled the advance of Nazism. In Upper Silesia, for example, the Nazis delayed introduction of racist laws because this would have violated the applicable international norms. Jews in the region, protected by a bilateral treaty between Poland and Germany, were sheltered from the Nuremberg laws and continued to enjoy equal rights, at least until the convention's expiry in 1937. 66 The minorities treaties are one of the forerunners of the modern international human rights legal system. They contributed the context for the work of Raphael Lemkin, who viewed the lack of punishment for gross violations to be among their major¯aws. Lemkin's pioneering work on genocide is to a large extent the direct descendant of the minorities treaties of the inter-war years.
Raphael Lemkin
Raphael Lemkin was born in eastern Poland, near the town of Bezwodene. He worked in his own country as a lawyer, prosecutor and university teacher. By the 1930s, internationally known as a scholar in the ®eld of international criminal law, he participated as a rapporteur in such important meetings as the Conferences on the Uni®cation of Criminal Law. A Jew, Lemkin¯ed Poland in 1939, making his way to Sweden and then to the United States, ®nding work at Duke University and later at Yale University. 67 He initiated the World Movement to Outlaw Genocide, working tirelessly to promote legal norms directed against the crime. Lemkin was present and actively involved, largely behind the scenes but also as a consultant to the Secretary-General, throughout the drafting of the Genocide Convention.`Never in the history of the United Nations has one private individual conducted such a lobby', wrote John P. Humphrey in his diaries. 68 Lemkin created the term`genocide' from two words, genos, which means race, nation or tribe in ancient Greek, 69 and caedere, meaning to kill in Latin. 70 As an alternative, he considered the ancient Greek term ethnos, which denotes essentially the same concept as genos. 71 Lemkin proposed the following de®nition of genocide:
[A] co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. 72 Lemkin's de®nition was narrow, in that it addressed crimes directed against`national groups' rather than against`groups' in general. At the same time, it was broad, to the extent that it contemplated not only physical genocide but also acts aimed at destroying the culture and livelihood of the group.
Lemkin's interest in the subject dated to his days as a student at Lvov University, when he intently followed attempts to prosecute the perpetrators of the massacres of the Armenians. 73 In 1933, he proposed the recognition of two new international crimes,`vandalism' and`barbarity' 68 (barbarie), in a report to the Fifth International Conference for the Uni®cation of Penal Law. 74 For Lemkin,`vandalism' constituted a crime of destruction of art and culture in general, because these are the property of`l'humanite Â civilise Âe qui, lie Âe par d'innombrables liens, tire toute entie Áre les pro®ts des efforts de ses ®ls, les plus ge Âniaux, dont les oeuvres entrent en possession de tous et augmentent leur culture'. In other words, the cultural objects in question belonged to humanity as a whole, and consequently humanity as a whole had an interest in their protection. 75 As for the crime of barbarie, this comprised acts directed against a defenceless`racial, religious or social collectivity', such as massacres, pogroms, collective cruelties directed against women and children and treatment of men that humiliates their dignity. Elements of the crime included violence associated with anti-social and cruel motives, systematic and organized acts, and measures directed not against individuals but against the population as a whole or a racial or religious group. 76 Lemkin credited the Romanian jurist Vespasien V. Pella with authorship of the concept, which appears in Pella's report to the third International Congress on Penal Law, held at Palermo in 1933. 77 
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe
A decade later, in his volume, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin af®rmed that the crimes he had recommended in 1933`would amount to the actual conception of genocide'. 78 But, as Sir Hartley Shawcross noted during the 1946 General Assembly debate, the 1933 conference rejected Lemkin's proposal. 79 During the war, Lemkin lamented the fact that, had his initiative succeeded, prosecution of Nazi atrocities would have been possible. 80 But the Allies proceeded anyway, on the basis of a de®nition of`crimes against humanity' that encompassed extermination' and`persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds'. 81 The International Military Tribunal and other post-war courts consistently dismissed arguments that this constituted ex post facto criminal law.
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New conceptions require new terms', explained Lemkin. Noting that genocide' referred to the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group, he described it as`an old practice in its modern development'. Genocide did not necessarily imply the immediate destruction of a national or ethnic group, but rather different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the group, with the aim of annihilating the group as such.`The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.'
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The major part of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe consisted of laws and decrees of the Axis powers and of their puppet regimes for the government of occupied areas. These were analyzed in detailed commentaries. One chapter of the book was devoted to the subject of the new crime of genocide. Lemkin de®ned several categories of genocide. Basing his examples on the practice of the Nazis in occupied Europe, he wrote that genocide was effected: through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of the captive peoples: in the political ®eld (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing a German pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); the social ®eld (by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide spiritual leaderships ± according to Hitler's statement in Mein Kampf,`the greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is beaten to death with a rubber truncheon'); in the cultural ®eld (by prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic thinking, which the occupant considers dangerous because it promotes national thinking); in the economic ®eld (by shifting the wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations by people who do not promote Germanism`without reservations'); in the biological ®eld (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting procreation by Germans in the occupied countries); in the ®eld of physical 81 existence (by introducing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in the religious ®eld (by interfering with the activities of the Church, which in many countries provides not only spiritual but also national leadership); in the ®eld of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement through promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures, and the excessive consumption of alcohol). 84 Lemkin identi®ed two phases in genocide, the ®rst being the destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group, and the second, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. 85 He referred to the war crimes commission established in 1919, which had used the term denationalization' to describe the phenomenon. 86 Lemkin also cited remarks by Hitler, speaking to Rauschning:
It will be one of the chief tasks of German statesmanship for all time to prevent, by every means in our power, the further increase of the Slav races. Natural instincts bid all living beings not merely conquer their enemies, but also destroy them. In former days, it was the victor's prerogative to destroy entire tribes, entire peoples. By doing this gradually and without bloodshed, we demonstrate our humanity. We should remember, too, that we are merely doing unto others as they would have done to us. 87 Yet Lemkin observed that while some groups were to be`Germanized' (Dutch, Norwegians, Flemings, Luxemburgers), others did not ®gure in the Nazi plans (Poles, Slovenes, Serbs), and, as for the Jews, they were to be destroyed altogether. 88 Lemkin wrote of the existence of`techniques of genocide in various ®elds' and then described them, including political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral genocide. Political genocide ± not to be confused with genocide of political groups, which Lemkin did not view as falling within the de®nition ± entailed the destruction of a group's political institutions, including such matters as forced name changes and other types of`Germanization'. 89 On the subject of physical destruction, Lemkin said it primarily transpired through racial discrimination in feeding, endangering of health, and outright mass killings. The chapter on genocide concluded with`recommendations for the future', calling for the`prohibition of genocide in war and peace'. 91 Lemkin insisted upon the relationship between genocide and the growing interest in the protection of peoples and minorities by the postFirst World War treaties. He noted the need to revisit international legal instruments, pointing out particularly the inadequacies of the Hague Regulations.
92 For Lemkin, the Hague Regulations dealt with technical rules concerning occupation,`but they are silent regarding the preservation of the integrity of a people'. 93 Lemkin urged their revision in order to incorporate a de®nition of genocide.`De lege ferenda, the de®nition of genocide in the Hague Regulations thus amended should consist of two essential parts: in the ®rst should be included every action infringing upon the life, liberty, health, corporal integrity, economic existence, and the honour of the inhabitants when committed because they belong to a national, religious, or racial group; and in the second, every policy aiming at the destruction or the aggrandizement of one of such groups to the prejudice or detriment of another'. 94 Lemkin also said that the Hague Regulations should be modi®ed`to include an international controlling agency vested with speci®c powers, such as visiting the occupied countries and making inquiries as to the manner in which the occupant treats natives in prison'. 95 But he also signalled the great shortcoming of the Hague Regulations: their limited application to circumstances of international armed con¯ict.
Lemkin observed that the system of minorities protection created following the First World War`proved to be inadequate because not every European country had a suf®cient judicial machinery for the enforcement of its constitution'. 96 He proposed the development of a new international multilateral treaty requiring States to provide for the introduction, in constitutions but also in domestic criminal codes, of norms protecting national, religious or racial minority groups from oppression and genocidal practices. Lemkin also had important recommendations with respect to criminal prosecution of perpetrators of genocide.`In order to prevent the invocation of the plea of superior orders', argued Lemkin,`the liability of persons who order genocidal practices, as well as of persons who execute such orders, should be 91 Ibid., p. 90. 92 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War by Land, note 9 above. 93 provided expressly by the criminal codes of the respective countries.' Finally, Lemkin urged that the principle of universal repression or universal jurisdiction be adopted for the crime of genocide. Lemkin made the analogy with other offences that are delicta juris gentium such as white slavery', trade in children and piracy, saying genocide should be added to the list of such crimes. 97 
Prosecuting the Nazis
During the Second World War activity intensi®ed with regard to the creation of an international criminal court and the international prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. An unof®cial body, the League of Nations Union, established what was known as thè London International Assembly' to work on the problem. In October 1943, it proposed the establishment of an international criminal court whose jurisdiction was to encompass`crimes in respect of which no national court had jurisdiction (e.g. crimes committed against Jews) . . .
[T]his category was meant to include offences subsequently described as crimes against humanity.' 98 On 17 December 1942, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden declared in the House of Commons that reports had been received`regarding the barbarous and inhuman treatment to which Jews are being subjected in German-occupied Poland', and that the Nazis were`now carrying into effect Hitler's oft repeated intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe'. Eden af®rmed his government's intention`to ensure that those responsible for these crimes shall not escape retribution'.
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The United Nations War Crimes Commission
The Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 is generally viewed as the seminal statement of the Allied powers on the subject of war crimes prosecutions. While referring to`evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions' being perpetrated by the Nazis, and warning those responsible that they would be brought to book for their crimes, there was no direct reference to the racist aspect of the offences or an indication that they involved speci®c national, ethnic and religious groups such as the Jews of Europe. 100 The United Nations Commission 101 was composed of representatives of most of the Allies and chaired by Sir Cecil Hurst of the United Kingdom. It initially agreed to use the list of offences that had been drafted by the Responsibilities Commission of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as the basis for its prosecutions. The enumeration was already recognized for the purposes of international prosecution. In addition, Italy and Japan had agreed to it, and Germany had never formally objected. 102 Although the 1919 list included the crime of`denationalization' as well as murder and ill-treatment of civilians, the Commission did not initially consider that its mandate extended to prosecutions for the extermination of European Jews. The Commission's`Draft Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations War Crimes Court', prepared in late 1944, was con®ned to`the commission of an offence against the laws and customs of war'. 103 Nevertheless, from an early stage in its work, there were efforts to extend the jurisdiction of the Commission to civilian atrocities committed against ethnic groups not only within occupied territories but also those within Germany itself. In the Legal Committee of the Commission, the United States representative Herbert C. Pell used the term`crimes against humanity' to describe offences`committed against stateless persons or against any persons because of their race or religion'. 104 On 24 March 1944, President Roosevelt referred in a speech to`the wholesale systematic murder of the Jews of Europe' and warned that`none who participate in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished'. 105 Nevertheless, the State Department was decidedly lukewarm to the idea that war crimes prosecutions might innovate and hold Germans accountable for crimes committed against minority groups within their own borders.
